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Abstract
We study a mixed oligopoly where a partially public firm competeswith a private firm. When
the private firm offers managerialincentives, there is a redistribution of profit and output
fromthe private to the public firm, but the aggregate output andsocial welfare may remain
unchanged. When the private firm isforeign owned, the extent of privatization is less
whilemanagerial incentives are milder.
We are grateful to the Associate Editor Quan Wen and an anonymous referee for their helpful comments and suggestions. The
remaining errors, if any, are our responsibility.
Citation: Saha, Bibhas and Rudra Sensarma, (2008) "The Distributive Role of Managerial Incentives in a Mixed Duopoly."
Economics Bulletin, Vol. 12, No. 27 pp. 1-10
Submitted: September 29, 2008.  Accepted: October 31, 2008.
URL: http://economicsbulletin.vanderbilt.edu/2008/volume12/EB-08L10033A.pdf
1. Introduction
The mixed oligopoly literature traditionally focuses on the aggressive behavior of a
public firm against its private rivals, and its impact on social welfare (De Fraja and
Delbono, 1989; Matsumura, 1998). This aggression primarily comes not from the gov-
ernment’s apathy or rivalry to private firms, but from its equal treatment of consumer
surplus and profit, which favors redistribution of gains from firms to consumers. What
is less emphasized is that if profit becomes relatively more important to the government
than consumer surplus, it will care not only about the public firm’s profit but also the
private firms’ profit. Once private firms realizes this, they can afford to be aggressive by
adopting profit enhancing strategies such as managerial incentives.
In the context of private oligopoly firms indeed offer sales-oriented incentives to their
managers to enhance their individual output and profit; in doing so collectively they might
over-produce ending up with less profit but generating higher social welfare than in the
no-incentive case (Sklivas, 1985; Vickers, 1985; Fershtman and Judd, 1987). We show
that such aggression might pay off against a rival public firm because the government
in its concern for the private firms’ profit will try to accommodate their aggression by
optimally reducing its share-holding in the public firm and cutting back its production.
In some cases the government will cut back the public firm’s output by exactly the same
amount that the private firms seek to increase their output by resorting to managerial
incentives, giving rise to a scenario where managerial incentives merely redistribute profit
and output in the private firms’ favor without affecting the aggregate output and social
welfare. This situation arises when marginal cost is constant and equal in all firms, so
that the distribution of output among firms does not matter for social welfare.
We also show that if the government values the rival firm’s profit less than the public
firm’s, the outcome will be quite different. A special case of this asymmetric treatment
arises when the rival firm is foreign-owned. The government will then not care for the
rival firm’s profit and will be prepared to counteract the rival firm’s aggression. Realizing
this the foreign firm will be less aggressive in its choice of managerial incentives and the
government will respond with less privatization. The aggregate output will be greater
than that in the no-incentive case as well as in the case of domestic competition. Thus,
foreign competition benefits the consumers more than domestic competition does, though
there is no technological superiority associated with foreign firms. The literatures on
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mixed oligopoly and managerial incentives are fairly well-established, but attempts to
bring them together have been very few. Only Chang (2007), Nakamura and Inoue
(2007) and Heywood and Ye (2008) considered mixed duopoly allowing for managerial
incentives, but while Chang’s work focussed exclusively on trade policy, the latter two
papers did not consider partial privatization.
2. The Model
We consider a two-stage game between a partially public firm (indexed 0) and a
private firm (indexed 1). In the first stage, the government decides on the share of public
ownership in firm 0, while firm 1 decides on managerial incentives. In the second stage
the two firms engage in Cournot competition.
The market demand is linear: p = a−b(q0+q1), b > 0. Marginal costs of the two firms
are symmetric and constant at c. We assume c < a < 3c. The first restriction (c < a) is
natural. The second restriction (a < 3c) is needed to ensure that managerial incentives
are effective. As managerial incentives work by altering the effective cost of production
from the manager’s perspective, incentives will be useful only if the marginal cost is not
too small.
The public firm is jointly owned by the government and a private partner, and the
choice of its output is made by the firm’s board of management consisting of a government
representative and the private partner. The public firm’s objective function is a weighted
average of social welfare and profit: z = θSW + (1 − θ)pi0, where SW is given by the
sum of consumer surplus and profit of the two firms, and θ represents the government’s
share-holding.
The public firm’s output choice is preceded by a decision of how much to divest or
privatize, and this decision lies at a higher level of government, whose concern is to
maximize social welfare. The government is also concerned with the solvency of the firms
which makes it ‘profit oriented’. In recent times governments around the world have
been concerned about financial health of firms in general, and public sector enterprises
in particular, for reasons of employment if not anything else. In emerging economies
such profit-concerns may be necessary to encourage greater investment in both private
and public sectors. We capture this ‘profit orientation’ through a modified social welfare
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function
V = CS + β0pi0 + β1pi1. (1)
Here βi ≥ 1 i.e. the government values profit more than consumer surplus. We first
consider the case β0 = β1 = β. One can then rewrite V as V = SW+(β−1)(pi0+pi1). Note
that the government’s objective function (V ) differs from the objective of the government
representative (SW ) in the public firm’s management board.
The private firm hires a manager and offers her incentives. Following the strategic
delegation literature, we assume a linear incentive scheme M = ρpi1 + (1 − ρ)pq1, which
rewards sales when ρ < 1. The manager is instructed to choose q1 to maximize M .
We begin with stage 2 of the game. The public firm’s output reaction function is
q0 =
(a−c)−bq1
b(2−θ) , and the private firm’s output reaction function is q1 =
(a−ρc)−bq0
2b
. The
equilibrium outputs are obtained as
q0 =
2(a− c)− (a− ρc)
b(3− 2θ) , q1 =
(a− ρc)(2− θ)− (a− c)
b(3− 2θ) ,
q = q0 + q1 =
(a− c) + (a− ρc)(1− θ)
b(3− 2θ) . (2)
q0 > 0 if a > c(2 − ρ), and q1 > 0 if a(1 − θ) > c[ρ(2 − θ) − 1]. The corresponding
expressions for profits are
pi0 =
(1− θ)[a+ c(ρ− 2)]2
b(3− 2θ)2 ,
pi1 =
(1− θ)[a+ c(ρ− 2)][(a− ρc)(2− θ)− (a− c)]
b(3− 2θ)2 .
We now move to the first stage of the game. The government and the private firm
determine their respective choice variables, viz. θ and ρ, simultaneously. The private
firm’s owner chooses ρ, its incentive reaction function, by maximizing pi1 as follows
ρ(θ) =
c(5− 2θ)− a
2c(2− θ) = 1−
a− c
2c
[
1
2− θ
]
.
The ‘incentive reaction function’ is downward sloping in θ, which means if the govern-
ment increases its ownership, the private firm will make its managerial incentive stronger
by reducing ρ. This reflects the fact that the private firm is aware of the government’s
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concern for its rival firm’s profit. In effect, greater nationalization induces the private
firm to become more aggressive.
The government’s privatization reaction function (θ) is derived by maximizing
V = CS + β(pi0 + pi1) = b
q2
2
+ β [a− bq − c] q.
The first order condition is
∂V
∂θ
= [bq + β(a− 2bq − c)] ∂q
∂θ
= 0.
Since ∂q
∂θ
> 0 as is evident from (2) we must have [bq + β(a− 2bq − c)] = 0. That is
given any ρ, the government’s best response θ must be such that the aggregate output q
remains unchanged at
q =
(a− c)
b
[
β
2β − 1
]
. (3)
Substituting the expression of q from (2) in this relation we derive the government’s
reaction function as
θ =
β[c(2ρ− 1)− a] + 2a− c(1 + ρ)
2βc(ρ− 1) + a− ρc .
Several points are noteworthy. First, if β = 1, optimal θ is 1 regardless of ρ. Second,
given β > 1, θ ∈ (0, 1). Privatization must be partial if profit is valued more than
consumer surplus. This is true even if ρ = 0. This is because the government wishes to
ensure positive profit for both firms. Third, θ′(ρ) > 0; from the government’s point of
view nationalization and (milder) managerial incentives are strategic complements. This
is exactly opposite of the perspective the private firm has. This is where a mixed duopoly
is crucially different from a pure duopoly. As the government cares about the industry
profit more than consumer surplus, it internalizes some of the negative effects that would
follow from aggressive output mobilization by both firms. So when the private firm is
expected to increase its output incentives and managerial aggression (by reducing ρ), the
public firm divests its ownership in order to accommodate this.
Equilibrium θ and ρ are
θ∗ = 3− 2β, ρ∗ = c(4β − 1)− a
2c(2β − 1) .
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It can be verified that given our assumption c < a < 3c, we have 0 < θ∗ < 1
and 0 < ρ∗ < 1 for β ≥ 1. The equilibrium q0 and q1 are also strictly positive at
(θ∗, ρ∗). Clearly, in equilibrium privatization is partial, and managerial incentives are
sales-oriented. This shows that managerial incentives can be an effective strategy to
counter the public firm’s nationalization. The government’s optimal privatization is such
that the industry output remains unchanged at a value given by (3) regardless of whether
the private firm offers managerial incentive or not. If there were no incentives (ρ = 1),
optimal privatization would be far less at θ = 2 − β. Though this would give rise to
the same q as in (3), the private firm would earn much lower profit and produce far less.
But managerial incentives induce the public firm to cut back its production and transfer
profit to the private firm. Thus, managerial incentives become purely redistributive. It
is also of some interest to note that aggregate output can fall below or exceed the pure
duopoly (without managerial incentives) level, depending on how much profit oriented
the government is. In the pure duopoly case without managerial incentives, total output
is q = 2(a−c)
3b
. This will be less than q∗, the mixed duopoly equilibrium output, if β < 2.
Proposition 1 Given β > 1, equilibrium (θ, ρ) will both lie strictly between 0 and 1.
Compared to the ‘no managerial incentives’ case, θ will be smaller causing q0 and pi0 also
to be smaller, but q1 and pi1 will be greater, while q and SW will be unchanged. Thus,
managerial incentives become merely redistributive having no efficiency effect.
3. Foreign competition
We now consider a special case where the government does not value the rival firm’s
profit at all, though it continues to value the public firm’s profit more than consumer
surplus. This case arises when the rival firm is foreign firm. We will see that the private
firm’s incentive response will be quite different. Here SW consists of consumer surplus
and the public firm’s profit while the government’s objective is obtained by setting β0 = β
and β1 = 0 in (1) i.e. V = CS + βpi0. Solving the game as usual by backward induction
we get the following output reaction functions: q0 =
(a−c)−b(1−θ)q1
b(2−θ) and q1 =
(a−ρc)−bq0
2b
.
The equilibrium outputs are obtained as
q0 =
2(a− c)− (a− ρc)(1− θ)
b(3− θ) , q1 =
(a− ρc)(2− θ)− (a− c)
b(3− θ) ,
q = q0 + q1 =
2a− c(1 + ρ)
b(3− θ) . (4)
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As before the aggregate output is increasing in θ and decreasing in ρ. We now de-
termine the simultaneous (first stage) choice of ρ and θ. From the private firm’s profit
maximization we get
ρ(θ) = 1− a− c
2c
[
1− θ
2− θ
]
.
To solve for the public firm’s response, we maximize the following with respect to θ
V = CS + βpi0 = b
q2
2
+ β [a− bq − c] q0. (5)
Substituting the expressions of q0 and q from (4) and carrying out the maximization we
derive the government’s privatization reaction function as
θ(ρ) =
β[a− c(2− ρ)] + [2a− c(1 + ρ)]
β[3a− c(2 + ρ)] .
It can be checked that θ′(ρ) > 0 and dθ/dβ < 0 as before. Further, ρ(0) = 5c−a
4c
> 0,
ρ(1) = 1 and ρ′(θ) > 0. On the other hand θ(0) = a(2+β)−c(1+2β)
β(3a−2c) > 0 and θ(1) =
2+β
3β
< 1.
Thus the intersection of ρ(θ) and θ(ρ) must occur at some (θ, ρ), such that 0 < θ < 1
and 0 < ρ < 1. Let this solution be denoted as (θ˜, ρ˜). So as before privatization is partial
and managerial incentive is sales oriented.
But there are some interesting differences. The incentive reaction function is now
upward sloping, while it was previously downward sloping. As the government chooses
greater nationalization, the foreign firm makes its incentives milder (as opposed to mak-
ing it stronger earlier). Realizing that the government will not care about its profit,
the foreign firm cannot afford to increase aggression. This reversal in the foreign firm’s
reaction and the hardening of the government’s stance against the rival firm are shown
in Figure 1. The foreign firm’s reaction function is given by the solid curve ρF (θ) and the
government’s reaction function by the solid curve θF (ρ), where the subscript F denotes
the case of foreign competition. As argued above, they must cross at an interior point
like (θ˜, ρ˜). The case of domestic competition has been shown by the two dotted reaction
curves. There the private firm’s reaction function ρ(θ) was declining, as shown by the
curve ρD(θ) (D denotes domestic competition). So it must be the case that the equilib-
rium ρ in the previous case was smaller than 5c−a
4c
and in the present case it is greater
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than 5c−a
4c
. That is, the private firm offers much milder incentive when it is foreign-owned,
than when it is domestically owned.
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~
θ
~
ρ
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ρF(θ)
ρD(θ)
θD(ρ)
*θ
*ρ
Figure 1: Equilibrium θ and ρ
As for privatization, θ∗ will be smaller than θ˜ if θD(ρ) lies to the left of θF (ρ). This,
however, cannot be directly ascertained, though it is clear that θD(ρ = 1) < θF (ρ = 1).
But it can be proved (what we do in the following proposition) that the aggregate output
will now be greater. From (4) we know that the aggregate output cannot rise if ρ has
risen, and if θ has also fallen. Therefore, an increase in q must imply a rise in θ. Thus
we must have θ˜ > θ∗ as depicted in Figure 1.
Greater θ also implies that the output of the public firm will rise and so will its market
share. It is also apparent from (5) that social welfare (which can be obtained by setting
β = 1) depends not only on the aggregate output, but also on the output of the public
firm (unlike in the previous case). The government’s optimal choice of θ dictates that
both the aggregate output and the public firm’s output change in response to the foreign
firm’s managerial incentives. Therefore, social welfare will not remain unchanged from
the no-managerial incentive case, though it is unclear whether it will rise or fall.
Nevertheless, it can be ascertained that q under managerial incentives will be greater.
This can be checked by visualizing that the iso-output line (obtained from equation
(4)) ρ = 2a−q¯b(3−θ)
c
− 1, when passing through the point (θ˜, ρ˜) must correspond to the
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equilibrium q. If a similar iso-output line passes through the ‘no-incentive equilibrium’
point (θ = β+2
3β
, ρ = 1), it must correspond to a lower q; for greater ρ at a given θ, q
must be smaller. Therefore, when the rival firm is foreign-owned, managerial incentives
are not merely redistributive; they clearly affect social welfare.
Proposition 2 As compared to the case of domestic competition, the equilibrium aggre-
gate output will be greater under foreign competition, and the associated privatization will
be smaller and managerial incentive milder; i.e. θ˜ > θ∗, ρ˜ > ρ∗. Given foreign competi-
tion, the case of no-managerial incentive produces a smaller aggregate output and smaller
privatization than the case of managerial incentives. Social welfare will not remain un-
changed between these two cases.
Proof: We need to prove that q under foreign competition is greater. Recall from the
previous section that q under domestic compeition was obtained as q∗ = a−c
b
[
β
2β−1
]
. Now
rewrite V from (5) as
V = b
q2
2
+ β [a− bq − c] q − β [a− bq − c] q1.
Maximizing V with respect to θ we get as the first order condition
∂V
∂θ
= [bq + β(a− 2bq − c)] ∂q
∂θ
− β [a− bq − c] ∂q1
∂θ
+ βbq1
∂q
∂θ
= 0.
Since ∂q1
∂θ
< 0 and ∂q
∂θ
> 0, the last two terms must be positive, and therefore, we must
have [bq + β(a − 2bq − c)] < 0. This implies q > a−c
b
[
β
2β−1
]
= q∗. The rest of the
proposition follows, as explained in the discussion above.
4. Conclusion
In this paper, we have introduced managerial incentives in a mixed duopoly with
constant marginal cost. We show that if the government is profit oriented, it will ac-
commodate the private firm’s aggression (via managerial incentives) and cut back its
own production through partial privatization. This accommodation does not occur if
the private firm is foreign-owned. Realizing this the foreign firm will offer milder man-
agerial incentives and the public firm will witness less privatization. Consumers benefit
the most under foreign competition. This difference in government’s attitude to private
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firms (depending on it being domestic or foreign) and its implications for privatization
and social welfare could be studied in other contexts as well, such as increasing marginal
cost, differentiated products and Stackelberg duopoly.
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